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The shadow banking system: 
implications for ﬁ  nancial regulation
The current ﬁ  nancial crisis has highlighted the changing role of ﬁ  nancial institutions and the growing 
importance of the “shadow banking system” that grew on the back of the securitisation of assets and 
the integration of banking with capital market developments. This trend has been most pronounced 
in the United States, but has had a profound inﬂ  uence for the global ﬁ  nancial system as a whole. 
In a market-based ﬁ  nancial system, banking and capital market developments are inseparable, and 
funding conditions are closely tied to the ﬂ  uctuations of leverage of market-based ﬁ  nancial intermediaries. 
Balance sheet growth of market-based ﬁ  nancial intermediaries provides a window on liquidity in the sense 
of availability of credit, while contractions of balance sheets have tended to precede the onset of ﬁ  nancial 
crises. Securitisation was intended as a way to disperse credit risk to those who were better able to 
absorb losses, but instead securitisation served to increase the fragility of the ﬁ  nancial system as a whole 
by allowing banks and other intermediaries to leverage up by buying each others’ securities. In the new, 
post-crisis ﬁ  nancial system, the role of securitisation is likely to be held in check by more stringent ﬁ  nancial 
regulation and the recognition of the importance of preventing excessive leverage and maturity mismatch 
in undermining ﬁ  nancial stability.
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T
he distinguishing mark of a modern ﬁ  nancial 
system is the increasingly intimate ties 
between banking and the capital markets. The 
success of macroprudential regulation will depend 
on being able to internalise the externalities that 
are generated in the shadow banking system. Before 
the current ﬁ  nancial crisis, the global economy was 
often described as being “awash with liquidity”, 
meaning that the supply of credit was plentiful. 
The ﬁ  nancial crisis has led to a drying up of this 
particular metaphor. Understanding the nature of 
liquidity in this sense leads us to the importance of 
ﬁ  nancial intermediaries in a ﬁ  nancial system built 
around capital markets, and the critical role played 
by monetary policy in regulating credit supply.
An important background is the growing importance 
of the capital market in the supply of credit, 
especially in the United States. Traditionally, banks 
were the dominant suppliers of credit, but their role 
has increasingly been supplanted by market-based 
institutions  –  especially those involved in the 
securitisation process. 
For the United States, Chart 1 compares total assets 
held by banks with the assets of securitisation pools 
or at institutions that fund themselves mainly by 
issuing securities. By the end of the second quarter 
of 2007 (just before the current crisis), the assets of 
this latter group, the “market-based assets”, were 
substantially larger than bank assets.
The growing importance of the market-based system 
can be seen from Chart 2, which charts the growth 
of four sectors in the United States – the household 
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Chart  2
Growth of assets of four sectors in the United States





































Source: US Flow of Funds, Federal Reserve.
sector, non-ﬁ  nancial corporate sector, commercial 
banking sector and the security broker dealer sector. 
All series have been normalised to 1 for March, 1954. 
We see the astonishingly rapid growth of the securities 
sector relative to the other sectors in the economy. 
Chart 3 contains the same series as in Chart 2, except 
that the vertical axis is in log scale. We see from 
Chart 3 that the rapid increase in the securities sector 
began around 1980.
Chart 3
Growth of assets of four sectors in the United States 































Source: US Flow of Funds, Federal Reserve.
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This take-off of the securities sector can be explained 
by the changing structure of the US financial 
system, and in particular by the changing nature 
of the residential mortgage market and the growing 
importance of securitisation.
Until the early 1980s, banks were the dominant 
holders of home mortgages, but bank-based holdings 
were overtaken by market-based holders (Chart 4). 
In Chart 5, “bank-based holdings” add up the holdings 
of commercial banks, savings institutions and credit 
unions. Market-based holdings are the remainder – 
the Government sponsored enterprises (GSE)   
mortgage pools, private label mortgage pools and 
the GSE holdings themselves. Market-based holdings 
now constitute two thirds of the 11 trillion dollar total 
of home mortgages.
1| CREDIT CRUNCH
In the current crisis, it is the market-based supply of 
Chart 4
Total holdings of US home mortgages 
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Chart 5
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Chart 6
New issuance of asset-backed securities 



































Sources: JP Morgan Chase and Adrian and Shin (2009).
credit that has seen the most dramatic contraction. 
Chart 6 plots the ﬂ  ow of new credit from the issuance 
of new asset-backed securities. The most dramatic 
fall is in the subprime category, but credit supply of 
all categories has collapsed, ranging from auto loans 
to credit card loans and student loans.
However, the drying up of credit in the capital 
markets would have been missed if one paid attention 
to bank-based lending only. As can be seen from 
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Chart 7, commercial bank lending has picked up 
pace after the start of the ﬁ  nancial crisis, even as 
market-based providers of credit have contracted 
rapidly. Banks have traditionally played the 
role of a buffer for their borrowers in the face of 
deteriorating market conditions (as during the 1998 




The long-term development of the US ﬁ  nancial 
system and its vulnerability to the current crisis 
raises several questions. At the margin, all ﬁ  nancial 
intermediaries (including commercial banks) have 
to borrow in capital markets, since deposits are 
insufﬁ  ciently responsive to funding needs. But for 
a commercial bank, its large balance sheet masks 
the effects operating at the margin. In contrast, 
securities ﬁ  rms have balance sheets that reﬂ  ect much 
more sensitively the effects operating in the capital 
markets. Below, we summarise the balance sheet of 
Lehman Brothers, as at the end of the 2007 ﬁ  nancial 
year, when total assets were USD 691 billion (Chart 8).
The two largest classes of assets are (i) long positions 
in trading assets and other ﬁ  nancial inventories 
and (ii) collateralised lending. The collateralised 
lending reﬂ  ected Lehman’s role as prime broker 
to hedge funds, and consisted of reverse repos and 
other types of collateralised lending. Much of the 
collateralised lending was short term, often overnight. 
The other feature of the asset side of the balance 
sheet is how small the holding of cash is. The cash 
holding is USD 7.29 billion out of a total balance sheet 
size of USD 691 billion.
The liabilities of Lehman Brothers reﬂ  ected the 
short-term nature of much of its liabilities. The largest 
component is collateralised borrowing, including 
repos. Short positions (“ﬁ  nancial instruments and 
other inventory positions sold but not yet purchased”) 
is the next largest component. Long-term debt is 
only 18% of total liabilities. One notable item is the 
“payables” category, which is 12% of total balance 
sheet size. Payables include the cash deposits of 
Lehman’s customers, especially its hedge fund 
clientele. It is for this reason that “payables” are 
much larger than “receivables” on the asset side of 
the balance sheet (only 6%). Hedge fund customers’ 
deposits are subject to withdrawal on demand, and 
proved to be an important source of funding instability.
In this way, broker-dealers (securities firms) 
have balance sheets that are in stark contrast to 
conventional deposit funded banks. Broker-dealers 
have traditionally played market-making and 
underwriting roles in securities markets, but their 
importance in the supply of credit has increased 
in step with securitisation. For this reason, broker 
dealers may be seen as a barometer of overall funding 
conditions in a market-based ﬁ  nancial system.
Chart 9 is taken from Adrian and Shin (2007) and 
shows the scatter chart of the weighted average of 
the quarterly change in assets against the quarterly 
change in leverage of the (then) ﬁ  ve stand-alone 
US investment banks (Bear Stearns, Goldman Sachs, 
Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch and Morgan Stanley). 
The striking feature is that leverage is procyclical in 
the sense that leverage is high when balance sheets are 
large, while leverage is low when balance sheets are 
small. This is exactly the opposite ﬁ  nding compared 
to households, whose leverage is high when balance 
sheets are small. For instance, if a household owns 
a house that is ﬁ  nanced by a mortgage, leverage 
falls when the house price increases, since the 
equity of the household is increasing at a faster rate 
than assets.
Chart 7
Annual growth rates of assets















Source: US Flow of Funds, Federal Reserve.
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Procyclical leverage offers a window on ﬁ  nancial 
system liquidity. In chart 9, the horizontal axis 
measures the (quarterly) growth in leverage, as 
measured by the change in log assets minus the 
change in log equity. The vertical axis measures 
the change in log assets. Hence, the 45-degree 
line indicates the set of points where (log) equity 
is unchanged. Above the 45-degree line equity is 
increasing, while below the 45-degree line, equity 
is decreasing. Any straight line with slope equal 
to 1 indicates constant growth of equity, with the 
intercept giving the growth rate of equity.
In Chart  9 the slope of the scatter chart is 
close to 1, implying that equity is increasing at a 
constant rate on average. Thus, equity plays the 
role of the forcing variable, and the adjustment in 
leverage primarily takes place through expansions 
and contractions of the balance sheet rather than 
through the raising or paying out of equity. We can 
understand the ﬂ  uctuations in leverage in terms 
of the implicit maximum leverage permitted by 
creditors in collateralised borrowing transactions 
such as repurchase agreements (repos). In a repo, 
the borrower sells a security today for a price below 
the current market price on the understanding that 
it will buy it back in the future at a pre-agreed price. 
The difference between the current market price 
of the security and the price at which it is sold is 
called the “haircut” in the repo. The ﬂ  uctuations in 
the haircut largely determine the degree of funding 
available to a leveraged institution, since the haircut 
determines the maximum permissible leverage 
achieved by the borrower. If the haircut is 2%, the 
borrower can borrow USD 98 for USD 100 worth of 
securities pledged. Then, to hold USD 100 worth 
of securities, the borrower must come up with 
USD 2 of equity. Thus, if the repo haircut is 2%, the 
maximum permissible leverage (ratio of assets to 
equity) is 50.
Suppose the borrower leverages up the maximum 
permitted level, consistent with maximising the 
return on equity. The borrower then has leverage 
of 50. If a shock raises the haircut, then the borrower 
must either sell assets, or raise equity. Suppose 
that the haircut rises to  4%. Then, permitted 
leverage halves from 50 to 25. Either the borrower 
must double equity or sell half its assets, or some 
combination of both. Times of ﬁ  nancial stress are 
associated with sharply higher haircuts, necessitating 
substantial reductions in leverage through asset 
Chart 8
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disposals or raising of new equity. Table 1 is taken 
from IMF (2008), and shows the haircuts in secured 
lending transactions at two dates – in April 2007 
before the ﬁ  nancial crisis and in August 2008 in the 
midst of the crisis. Haircuts are substantially higher 
during the crises than before.
The ﬂ  uctuations in leverage resulting from shifts 
in funding conditions are closely associated with 
epochs of ﬁ  nancial booms and busts. Chart 10 plots 
the leverage US primary dealers – the set of 18 banks 
that has a daily trading relationship with the Fed. 
They consist of US investment banks and US bank 
holding companies with large broker subsidiaries 
(such as Citigroup and JP Morgan Chase).
The plot shows two main features. First, leverage 
has tended to decrease since 1986. This decline in 
leverage is due to the bank holding companies in 
the sample – a sample consisting only of investment 
banks shows no such declining trend in leverage 
(see Adrian and Shin, 2007). Secondly, each of the 
peaks in leverage is associated with the onset of 
a ﬁ  nancial crisis (the peaks are 1987Q2, 1998Q3, 
2007Q4). Financial crises tend to be preceded by 
marked increases of leverage.
The ﬂ  uctuations of credit in the context of secured 
lending expose the fallacy of the “lump of liquidity” 
in the ﬁ  nancial system. The language of “liquidity” 
suggests a stock of available funding in the ﬁ  nancial 
system which is redistributed as needed. However, 
when liquidity dries up, it disappears altogether 
rather than being re-allocated elsewhere. When 
haircuts rise, all balance sheets shrink in unison, 
resulting in a generalised decline in the willingness 
to lend. In this sense, liquidity should be understood 
in terms of the growth of balance sheets (i.e. as a 
ﬂ  ow), rather than as a stock.
3| ROLE OF SECURITISATION
The fluctuations of market funding conditions 
have important implications for ﬁ  nancial stability 
and international capital ﬂ  ows. Indeed, there is an 
intimate connection between the emergence of 
subprime mortgages and the large US external deﬁ  cits 
in the middle years of this decade. The chain that 
ties the two is securitisation.
Securitisation refers to the practice of parcelling 
and selling of loans to investors. It was intended as 
a way to disperse risks associated with bank lending 
so that deep-pocketed investors who were better able 
to absorb losses would share the risks. But in reality, 
securitisation worked to concentrate risks in the 
banking sector. There was a simple reason for this. 
Banks and other intermediaries wanted to increase 
their leverage – to become more indebted – so as 
to spice up their short-term proﬁ  t. So, rather than 
dispersing risks evenly throughout the economy, 
banks and other intermediaries bought each other’s 
securities with borrowed money. As a result, 
far from dispersing risks, securitisation had the 
perverse effect of concentrating all the risks in the 
banking system itself.
In the process, increased leverage fuelled by 
securitisation exacerbated global imbalances. 
To understand the role of securitisation, it is 
Table 1
Haircuts on repo agreements
(%)
Securities April 2007 August 2008
US treasuries 0.25 3
Investment-grade bonds 0-3 8-12
High-yield bonds 10-15 25-40
Equities 15 20
Senior leveraged loans 10-12 15-20
Mezzanine leveraged loans 18-25 35+
Prime MBS 2-4 10-20
ABS 3-5 50-60
Source: IMF Global Financial Stability Report, October 2008.
Chart 10
Mean leverage of US primary dealers





























Sources: SEC 10-K and 10-Q ﬁ  lings and Adrian and Shin (2009).
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important to take a system-wide perspective on 
ﬁ  nancial intermediation. In a traditional banking 
system that intermediates between retail depositors 
and ultimate borrowers, the total quantity of deposits 
represents the obligation of the banking system to 
creditors outside the banking system. However, 
securitisation opens up potentially new sources 
of funding for the banking system by tapping 
new creditors. The new creditors who buy the 
securitised claims include pension funds, mutual 
funds and insurance companies, as well as foreign 
investors such as foreign central banks. Foreign 
central banks have been a particularly important 
funding source for residential mortgage lending in 
the United States.
When the claims and obligations between leveraged 
entities have been netted out, the lending to ultimate 
borrowers must be funded either from the equity 
of the intermediary sector or by borrowing from 
creditors outside the intermediary sector. To see this, 
consider a simpliﬁ  ed balance sheet of an individual 
bank, as follows:
Assets
Loans to firms, 
Claims on other banks
Liabilities to non-banks 




By “bank” we mean any leveraged institution. In the 
US context, this includes securities ﬁ  rms, hedge funds 
and the government sponsored enterprises (GSEs) 
such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. When 
balance sheets are aggregated across banks, all the 
claims and obligations between banks cancel out. 
So, the aggregate balance sheet for the banking 
sector as a whole looks as follows:
Assets




Liabilities to non-banks 
(deposits + securitised debt)
Aggregate lending to end-user borrowers by the 
banking system must be ﬁ  nanced either by the equity 
in the banking system or by borrowing from creditors 
outside the banking system. For any ﬁ  xed proﬁ  le 
of equity and leverage across individual banks, the 
total supply of credit to ultimate borrowers is larger 
when the banks borrow more from creditors outside 
the banking system. Put differently, the leverage of 
the ﬁ  nancial sector as a whole is increasing as banks 
resort to greater securitisation.
The supply of credit is the outcome of increased 
leverage of the banking sector as a whole. As balance 
sheets expand, new borrowers must be found. In other 
words, new assets must be generated that will ﬁ  ll 
expanding balance sheets. When all prime borrowers 
have a mortgage, but still balance sheets need to 
expand, then banks have to lower their lending 
standards in order to lend to subprime borrowers. 
The seeds of the subsequent downturn in the credit 
cycle are thus sown.
When the downturn arrives, the bad loans are either 
sitting on the balance sheets of the large ﬁ  nancial 
intermediaries, or they are in special purpose 
vehicles (SPVs) that are sponsored by them. This 
is so, since the bad loans were taken on precisely 
in order to expand total assets and raise leverage. 
Although ﬁ  nal investors such as pension funds and 
insurance companies will suffer losses, too, the large 
ﬁ  nancial intermediaries are more exposed in the 
sense that they face the danger of seeing their capital 
wiped out. The severity of the current credit crisis 
lies precisely in the fact that the bad loans were not 
all passed on to ﬁ  nal investors.
In this way, the subprime crisis has its origin in the 
increased supply of loans – or equivalently, in the 
imperative to ﬁ  nd new assets to ﬁ  ll the expanding 
balance sheets. This explains two features of the 
subprime crisis – ﬁ  rst, why apparently sophisticated 
ﬁ  nancial intermediaries continued to lend to borrowers 
of dubious creditworthiness, and second, why such 
sophisticated ﬁ  nancial intermediaries held the bad 
loans on their own balance sheets, rather than passing 
them on to other unsuspecting investors. Both facts are 
explained by the imperative to use up slack in balance 
sheet capacity during an upturn in the credit cycle.
Table 2 shows that of the approximately USD 1.4 trillion 
total exposure to subprime mortgages, around half 
of the potential losses were borne by US leveraged 
ﬁ  nancial institutions, such as commercial banks, 
securities ﬁ  rms, and hedge funds. When foreign 
leveraged institutions are included, the total exposure 
of leveraged ﬁ  nancial institutions rises to two-thirds.
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1  The consensus that emerged at the G20 summit in London on April 2nd 2009 is that capital requirements should be designed so that regulations restrain excesses 
when market-determined capital ratios fail to do so.
base capital adequacy rules explicitly on measures 
of systemic risk of particular institutions.
Whether the binding regulatory constraints 
come through leverage bounds, forward-looking 
provisioning, explicit countercyclical capital rules, or 
systemic capital rules, is a matter of implementation. 
The underlying spirit is the same: ﬁ  nancial system 
risk caused by market failure provides a rationale for 
public policy. Regulation with the aim of mitigating 
ﬁ  nancial system risk must aim at reducing the 
adverse effects of the market failures that are the 
root cause of the crisis. Policy that is guided by the 
right economic theory are giving rise to philosophy of 
regulation with the best chance of living up to the task. 
Only a regulatory system that has the system-wide 
perspective can meet the challenges ahead.
Currently, ﬁ  nancial regulation combines two distinct 
activities. One is the monitoring of individual 
institutions for their impact on system stability, 
another is the investor and consumer protection 
regulation. As important as business and consumer 
protection roles are, their purpose is very different 
from that of a systemic regulator, and need a different 
set of skills as well as a different mindset. Consumer 
advocacy and prosecuting market abuse involve 
setting and then enforcing the appropriate rules 
under a transparent legal framework. Such work is 
best done by lawyers and accountants who specialise 
in rule-making and enforcement. The Securities and 
Exchange Commission in the United States is a good 
example of such a regulator. However a conduct 
of business regulator is ill-equipped to cope with 
a systemic crisis where the problem is not one of 
enforcing rules.
One element of improved regulation will be a 
macroprudential systemic regulator who could 
take on two important tasks. First, the systemic 
regulator should gather, analyse, and report systemic 
information. This will require reporting from a broader 
range of ﬁ  nancial institutions, such as hedge funds. 
Second, the systemic regulator will operate capital 
rules with a systemic focus. The G20  meeting in 
London has afﬁ  rmed both principles, and the reform 
of the regulatory framework is likely to incorporate 
both. Given the central bank’s intimate connections 
with the ﬁ  nancial market through its monetary policy 
role, it is likely to have the best market intelligence in 
Table 2







Investment banks 75 5
Commercial banks 418 31
GSEs 112 8
Hedge funds 291 21
Insurance companies 319 23
Finance companies 95 7
Mutual and pension funds 57 4
Leveraged sector 896 66
Unleveraged sector 472 34
Total 1,368 100
Source: Greenlaw, Hatzius, Kashyap and Shin (2008).
4| FINANCIAL REGULATION
Having identiﬁ  ed the problem as the excessive 
growth of leverage during the boom, the remedy 
that has gained recent support by policy makers 
is the imposition of tighter regulation, especially 
regulation that targets the procyclical nature of 
the current system of capital regulation under the 
Basel II system. Many ideas have been advanced, 
of which we will discuss four.  1 The first is an 
explicit leverage ratio bound that restrains growth 
of leverage at the peak of cycles. Switzerland has 
recently implemented such a system, and the 
Financial Stability Forum (2009) has recommended 
a broader review of such a leverage ratio. The second 
is the forward-looking provisioning scheme used 
by Spain, where a provision is created at the time 
that a bank makes a loan, and the provision goes 
through the income statement of the bank. This 
system of forward-looking provisioning has been 
credited with maintaining a more robust banking 
system thus far in Spain relative to other European 
countries, in spite of the Spanish housing boom. 
Third, several recent policy reports have advocated 
explicit countercyclical capital rules (see, for instance, 
the Geneva Report, 2009, and the Joint Financial 
Stability Forum (FSF)–Committee on the Global 
Financial System (CGFS) Working Group, 2009, on 
the role of valuation and leverage in procyclicality). 
Fourth, Adrian and Brunnermeier (2009) propose to 
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performing the role of the macroprudential regulator. 
Furthermore, the fact that the central bank is the 
lender of last resort (LOLR) gives it the capacity to 
intervene in the market when necessary. In any 
event, if the central bank is likely to be called upon 
during times of crisis to play its role in the resolution 
of problem institutions, it should be in a position to 
assess the true conditions of the problem institution. 
The best way that such information can be gained is 
through on-site examinations, perhaps together with 
the main regulatory agency.
In the new, post-crisis ﬁ  nancial system, many familiar 
features of the system before the crisis will cease to be 
in place. The role of securitisation is likely to be held 
in check by more stringent ﬁ  nancial regulation and the 
recognition of the importance of preventing excessive 
leverage and maturity mismatch in undermining 
ﬁ  nancial stability. Institutional changes and the conduct 
of monetary policy will ﬂ  ow from the recognition of the 
role of the ﬁ  nancial system as the servant of the real 
economy, rather than an end in itself. In particular, we 
might see the return of a more staid “utilities” version of 
banking based on the model of banking as a support to 
the real economy.
In retrospect, the boom in the securities sector seen in 
Charts 2 and 3 earlier could be seen as the emergence 
of a thirty-year bubble that began in  1980, and 
which burst with the ﬁ  rst outbreak of the subprime 
in the summer of 2007. We are still feeling the after 
effects of that bursting.
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